Revisiting the Ability of Interest Rate Spreads to Predict Recessions: Evidence for a by Esther Fernández Galar & Javier Gómez Biscarri
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Universidad de Navarra
Working Paper nº 04/03
 Revisiting the Ability of Interest Rate Spreads to
Predict Recessions:




Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Universidad de NavarraRevisiting the Ability of Interest Rate Spreads to Predict Recessions: Evidence for a
Small European Economy
Esther Fernández Galar and Javier Gómez Biscarri
Working Paper No.04/03
January 2003
JEL No. E44, C53
ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine the power of the interest rate spread and of other
financial variables as predictors of economic recessions in Spain. The domestic term
spread is found to have little information about future real activity. However, term
spreads in big economies to which Spain is related, specifically Germany and the US,
are found to have significant predicting power but at different time horizons. Both
these findings are in line with the facts that the monetary policy of Spain has not been
independent and that it has been conditioned by that of other big economies, most
notably Germany.
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Recent economic events, especially the recession that has struck some of the
advanced economies in late 2000 and 2001, have revived the interest for the
empirical study of economic cycles, especially for the factors that determine
whether an economy stays into an expansion or moves into a recession (see
Leamer, 2001, for an original analysis of the causes and characteristics of eco-
nomic expansions), or the variables that can help predict the direction that the
economy is taking.
Policymakers, for example, are among the most avid consumers of forecast-
ing or structural econometric models developed in order to predict future rates
of growth, or future levels of activity. In particular, and given the attention
that a single economist, the Chairman of the Fed, generates, it is fair to say
that monetary policy is now in the spotlight of most economic policy analyses.
Should the Fed, or any other central bank (CB) for that matter, target real
activity or should it just focus on price stability? Could the Fed or the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB) have reacted sooner to avoid or smooth the last
recession? These and other questions are now being more frequently asked,and
are putting increased pressure on monetary policymakers to anticipate economic
ﬂuctuations and smooth them accordingly. An important part of the job of the
Central Bank is therefore to gather the information about current and, if pos-
sible, future economic conditions, so that policy decisions (if at all the CB is
targeting real output) can be taken at the right moment or, better, enough in
advance so that lags in policy eﬀectiveness can be taken into account and the
worse real consequences can be avoided .
The issue of predicting real economic activity is, however, not only of interest
for the Central Bank, though, but also for most agents in the economy. In
particular, a key issue, related to the above, involves trying to guess the stance
of the monetary policy (is it being expansionary or contractionary?), which
would yield indications as to where real activity is heading. The inverse could
also be true: Agents might want to predict the direction of real activity since
that would then give clues about the immediate stance of monetary policy and
signal, for example, upcoming movements in interest rates.
However, traditional indicators of monetary policy stance, by which one
could gather information about the actions of the Central Bank, were mone-
tary aggregates and exchange rates in addition to the outcomes of structural
macroeconomic models built for forecasting purposes. All these indicators have
been shown to be problematic and unstable, and so agents have looked for al-
ternative indicators in the hope of ﬁnding variables that have predictive content
about future developments of economic activity. Most agents could relate to an
analysis that helped predict whether the economy is going to suﬀer a recession
in the near future. In particular, could the last recession have been predicted
beforehand by using indicator variables that incorporate information about the
future?
Probably the most relevant of these indirect indicators is the term spread of
interest rates, that is, the diﬀerence between a long term rate and a short term
2rate. A substantial amount of research has been done on the predictive ability of
the term spread for future activity, and the results have been quite encouraging,
showing that indeed the informational content of the term spread about future
output is high. However, most of the research has been carried out for the cases
of big economies, mainly the US, Germany and the UK. A key characteristic of
these economies is that they have had fairly independent monetary policies in
the last few years, especially since the breakup of the managed ﬂoating of the
European Monetary System.1 Very little, if at all, research has been done on
smaller economies, whose policies are instead constrained by some dependency
of a big economy or by the sometimes unoﬃcial links of the central bank to the
government. Theoretical arguments posit that the predictive content of spread-
type of variables should be substantially diminished if a country does not have
an independent monetary policy or if the monetary policy does not target real
activity. Thus, the analysis of the predictive content of ﬁnancial variables for
a smaller economy with signiﬁcant dependencies may shed light on the true
character of these variables as predictors of future economic conditions.
In this paper we study the informational content of some ﬁnancial variables,
placing special emphasis on term spreads, about future economic conditions in
Spain. Spain is a country that meets the above conditions of being smaller than
the major economies and of being suspect of not having an independent mon-
etary policy, both because of the Bank of Spain’s former relationship with the
government and because of its participation in the European Monetary System
(EMS) and the subsequent transition period undergone in order to qualify for
the European Monetary Union (EMU). Our ﬁndings are striking. The informa-
tional content of domestic ﬁnancial variables in Spain is non-existent regarding
future real activity. However, we show how foreign term spreads of countries
to which Spain is related (Germany and the US) do have substantial predictive
power of real output, and could have helped, for example, predict the recession
that, if not oﬃcially, hit Spain shortly before the end of 2000.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical arguments
for the predictive content of ﬁnancial variables, placing special emphasis on
interest rate spreads and their relation to future economic activity. Section
3 develops the empirical analysis used to ascertain the extent to which these
ﬁnancial variables have predictive content in Spain. Section 4 presents the
results of the analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The informational Content of Financial Vari-
ables
The literature on why current values of ﬁnancial variables have information
about future activity and future inﬂation is by now abundant. All dynamic
general equilibrium models, and most static ones including some interest parity
1In the case of Germany, of course, this was true until January 1999, when it surrendered
its national monetary policy to the European Central bank (ECB).
3condition or a Fisher-type eﬀect, will yield a forward looking solution for some
variable, in which its current value is a function of the discounted expected future
path of a set of fundamental variables. Stock prices, for example, are a forward
looking variable, a function of future dividends. Thus, the value of a stock
today is supposed to have information about expectations about the future.
If these expectations are rational, then the evolution of a stock price today
should be informative about future proﬁts of the company. This was also the
argument in Campbell and Shiller (1988) when they derived a solution for the
current dividend yield as a function of expectations of future stock returns, thus
positing that current dividends might have information about future returns.
In this paper we are interested in the informational content of some ﬁnancial
variables, mainly the term spread, but also foreign term spreads and stock prices
or exchange rates, about future real activity. If any of these variables has power
to predict a future growth or decline in real activity, then this variable could
reasonably be used for planning and economic policy purposes. We review now
some of the theoretical arguments that support the predictive power of our
ﬁnancial variables of interest, some which are based on arguments similar to the
one outlined above whereas others are based mainly on the interplay between
the Fisher eﬀect and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
2.1 The Term Spread
The term spread, that is, the diﬀerence between a long and a short term interest
rate, has been the object of a number of analyses that show its ability to predict
not only future output and real activity, but also future inﬂation rates. Bernanke
(1990) and Mishkin (1990) are among the ﬁrst and most relevant papers that
show that term spreads must have information, under certain circumstances,
about future inﬂation and future output. The argument usually rests on the
fact that long rates are, under the expectations hypothesis, predicting the future
path of real rates and inﬂation rates. Hamilton and Kim (2002) give a clear and
concise account of the theory and give a further interpretation of the ability
of the spread to predict future activity by decomposing the spread into two
diﬀerent terms, one which accounts for future expected rates and one which
accounts for the term premium.2
Imagine that we have a short and a long riskless rate. If there are no liquidity
or risk diﬀerences between the two, the spread between both rates has to be a
consequence of a diﬀerence in expected real rates and expected future inﬂation
rates with respect to the current period. This simple realization allows us to
infer the reasons why the value of the spread today may be related to future
activity.
2This decomposition hinges on the existence of a term premium, which may stem from
either a risk premium or a liquidity premium. They diﬀerentiate both terms by using an
IV estimator. This decomposition is necessary if risky interest rates are used, given that,
as we develop below, the term premium and the future expected rates term have opposite
implications in terms of the predictability of future activity.
4The ﬁrst and most widely used argument, rests on current monetary pol-
icy, and its countercyclical character. Suppose that the Central Bank adopts a
transitory expansionary monetary policy and increases money supply. This will
be associated with an immediate decline in short-term rates, both nominal and
real. However, longer term rates will move down by a lesser amount, both be-
cause a current monetary expansion raises long term inﬂation expectations and
because it will be expected that the Central Bank will revert back to a contrac-
tionary policy, neutral or anti-inﬂationary in the future, with the subsequent
increase in short rates. These two combined movements of short and long rates
make the spread increase, causing a steepening of the yield curve. Given that
the cause of the widening of the spread was an expansionary monetary policy
that leads to lower current real rates, an increase in real activity is expected
to follow, and thus the bigger spread would be anticipating an increase in real
activity.
A similar argument rests, instead, on expected future monetary policy. If
the market expects a future expansive monetary policy, the real rate of interest
will be expected to decrease which in turn would expand output in the future.
At the same time, the current nominal long term rate of interest will increase if
inﬂationary expectations are created. For this argument to lead to the positive
relationship between current spreads and future activity the expected increase
in inﬂation must be bigger than the expected decrease in the real rate.
A more formal treatment of these monetary policy—related arguments can
be found in the model that incorporates a monetary policy reaction function in
Estrella (1997). In this model of dynamic rational expectations with a monetary
policy reaction function, a positive relationship is obtained between the yield
curve slope and future growth in real activity if the Central Bank is targeting
real activity. If the only objective of the Central Bank is inﬂation, then this link
disappears.
This latter argument is not a minor point. For the spread to have any
predictive power, and this rests mainly on the above arguments all of which are
related to real-side implications of monetary policy, or at least to be manifest in
the data, we need the Central Bank to have a stance (oﬃcially or unoﬃcially)
of carrying countercyclical monetary policy. The Fed indeed has this explicit
function, whereas the ECB does not have it as an oﬃcial objective.3 Even so,
we believe that in the light of the ECB’s actions during the last recession, it can
be considered, at least unoﬃcially, to have a secondary objective of inﬂuencing
the real side of the economy.
Additionally, we need the CB’s monetary policy to be eﬀective in aﬀecting
real activity, should it decide to do so Regarding the eﬀectiveness of monetary
policy, or the ability of the CB to inﬂuence economic activity, some issues have
to be mentioned. The ﬁrst of these relates to the independence of the CB as
the only institution responsible for making policy decisions. If the CB is not
independent from the government and is required to ﬁnance government budget
3Most national Central Banks of the European countries prior to EMU did not have as a
formal objective that of inﬂuencing the real side of the economy either, especially during the
transition period before 1999.
5deﬁcits, then one would not expect the term spread to truly reﬂect expectations
about future rates or inﬂation, given that monetary policy wouldbe conditioned
by the ﬁnancial needs of the government. Eﬀectiveness of monetary policy
consequently depends on the ability of the CB to deploy its instruments without
being inﬂuenced or constrained by the ﬁscal side of the economy. Thus, it is now
generally accepted that ﬁscal and monetary policy decisions should be made by
independent institutions, and that central banks should be completely detached
from the Government structure. Speciﬁcally, both the Fed and the ECB are
independent institutions, this independence being more evident, if possible, for
the ECB. Of course, this has not always been the case: Some of the European
nations had to legally overcome a history of formal dependence of the CB before
they could take part in the European Monetary System (EMS) and, later, in
the euro area. This casts some serious doubts about the extent to which term
spreads may have been reﬂecting future economic conditions in those countries.
A second issue that has arisen in international comparisons of the predictabil-
ity of real activity from ﬁnancial or monetary variables, is that this eﬀect will be
more intense in countries with internationally independent monetary policies,
such as Germany and the US (Bernard and Gerlach, 1998). Given that our
objective in this paper is to analyze the predictive power of ﬁnancial variables
in European countries, two considerations make this independence diﬃcult to
justify for a subset of the countries used in the analysis. First, the EMS ar-
rangement that required European countries to actively manage the exchange
rate and keep it within a band, was for all purposes constraining the mone-
tary policy of the member countries, especially of those whose currency was
subject to higher pressure and volatility. A second, less subtle dependence was
created during the very process that led to the birth of the ECB: The Maas-
tricht Treaty convergence criteria that EU countries had to meet to take part
in the euro area forced small European countries to keep some macro variables,
most notably inﬂation and interest rates, within a certain range from those of
the best performing countries, of which Germany was the immediate reference.
Thus, the monetary policy of these EU countries was eﬀectively constrained by
their need to meet the convergence criteria. Some of these countries, mostly the
Southern European countries (Italy, Portugal and Spain) had to accept, in fact,
painful real eﬀects in their economies in order to maintain the value of some
nominal variables within convergence levels.
All the reasons outlined above, which directly impede the ability of the cen-
tral bank to inﬂuence real activity, lead us to expect a lower predicting power of
domestic spreads for Spain with regards to future activity, more noticeable given
the dissimilarity of the Spanish economy with that of the EU reference country,
Germany (so that the necessity to keep ﬁnancial variables in line with those of
Germany has eﬀectively constrained Spanish monetary policy eﬀectiveness).
Some simple dynamic IS-LM models can also be used to show a relationship
between current spreads and future activity. In a world of sticky prices in the
short run (so constant expected inﬂation), short term ﬂuctuations lead mostly
to output changes, and therefore interest rates must be increasing to maintain
equilibrium in the money market. Thus, expecting future output shocks leads
6to expected increases in the interest rates and the spread today should widen
to reﬂect those expected higher future rates.
Other, more formal, arguments have been developed that point at the exis-
tence of a positive relationship between the slope of the yield curve and future
activity. Harvey (1988) develops a CCAPM model that yields this relationship
based on the smoothing of consumption (easily detectable in the traditional
Euler condition). Kydland and Prescott (1988) set up an RBC type of model
where again consumption smoothing leads to a similar solution (and to the same
ﬁrst order condition; see Romer, 1998). In their setting, expected productiv-
ity shocks which lead to an increase in expected future output also lead to a
higher real interest rate as agents substitute current for future consumption
with the corresponding steepening of the yield curve. Given that these models
are speciﬁed in terms of real rates, if we use nominal rates in the analysis, we
need to assume that inﬂation expectations do not play a role (or that inﬂation
expectations are the same regardless of the time horizon or interest maturity).
Some alternative analyses of spreads have used risky rates to compute the
spreads. Analysis on the Paper-Bill Spread, the diﬀerence between a short
term risky rate and the riskless rate and on the term spread on risky rates,
the diﬀerence between a long term risky rate and a short term risky rate, lead
in fact to the opposite relationship: A narrowing of those spreads is identiﬁed
with a lower probability of recession or with higher future real activity.4 In this
paper we do not focus on these spreads, which reﬂect market’s expectations of
risk more than monetary policy actions or eﬀectiveness.
Empirical analyses of the predictive power of term spreads can be found
in Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) for the US economy and Davis and Fagan
(1997) for a group of developed economies, where also predictability of inﬂa-
tion rates is analyzed; Bonser-Neal and Morley (1997), Estrella and Mishkin
(1997) and Bernard and Gerlach (1998) analyze this predictability in a multi-
country setting; Estrella, Rodrigues and Schich (2000) study the stability of this
predictive relationship, concerned mostly about a Lucas type of critique. For
speciﬁc countries, Davis and Henry (1994) analyze the case of the UK, Smets
and Tsatsaronis (1997) put special emphasis in the evidence for Germany and
its comparison with the US and Atta-Mensah and Kacz (2001) study the case
4Friedmann and Kuttner (1993, 1998) show how the spread between risky commercial
paper and riskless T-bills leads cycles, but the relationship is in this case negative. A current
higher spread signals that the perceived risk in the economy is higher, thus predicting less
future activity and a higher probability of recession. Hamilton and Kim (2002) use the risky
term spread, where a risky long term rate is subtracted of a risky short term. This spread is
incorporating both expected increases in real rates and inﬂa t i o nr a t e sa n de x p e c t e di n c r e a s e s
in the risk of the economy. An increase in expected risk anticipates a higher probability of
output reductions (recessions) and therefore an increase on the spread of risky assets could
be negatively related to future activity and this eﬀect should be decoupled from the usual
positive relationship explained above.
Kwark (2002) builds a more formal general equilibrium model that yields this same conclu-
sion in the context of risky loans and investment decisions. In Kwarks’s model, investment is
done before shocks hit the economy. Therefore, when a positive shock narrows the spread by
lowering the default risk of risky loans, this increases investment in the following period and
therefore the narrowing of the spread is leading increases in future activity.
7of Canada. Lahiri and Wang (1996) provide a survey of and extensions to the
theory and results on the predictive power of the spread. We review in greater
detail some of the more relevant evidence for our paper, focused on Europe and
Spain, in Subsection 2.3.
2.2 Other relevant variables
Other ﬁnancial variables that have been found to have predictive power about
future activity are foreign spreads, stock returns, exchange rates, central banks’
discount rates and monetary aggregates.
2.2.1 Foreign Spreads
The term “foreign spreads” may be a little misleading, since it can be interpreted
as the term spread in foreign countries or as the spread between a national and
a foreign interest rate.
I nt h ec a s eo ft h es p r e a db e t w e e nad o m e s t i ca n daf o r e i g ni n t e r e s tr a t e ,t h e
argument follows from uncovered interest parity, by which the current spread
should be reﬂecting information about the future evolution of the exchange rate.
Therefore, if there is a link between the exchange rate and real activity, the cur-
rent foreign spread should be predicting expected activity. A bigger spread now
(the national interest rate is higher) reﬂects expectations of future depreciation
of the national currency, associated with an expansion in real output. Davis
and Henry (1994) and Davis and Fagan (1997) show that there is some mild
predictive power in these foreign spreads, but secondary to that of the domestic
term spread.
The other possible foreign spread that could be used is the term spread in a
foreign country. For instance, using the term spread in Germany or the US to
predict future activity in Spain. There are three channels for predictive power
of these spreads. First, spreads in foreign countries may be predicting future
activity in those countries. If these countries are signiﬁcant trade partners or big
economies that can impact the world interest rate (think of the last US recession
and its inﬂuence on world interest rates) then future activity in the domestic
country will be inﬂuenced in the same way. Second, the spread in the foreign
country may be reﬂecting the monetary policy in that foreign country. If the
domestic country’s monetary policy is tied to or dependent on that of the foreign
country (think of the EMS system or of the Maastricht requirements that we
mentioned above, which for all purposes constrained some European economies
to not have a monetary policy focused on targeting real activity, but on tracking
Germany’s inﬂation and interest rates) then foreign spreads may well be more
informative about future domestic activity than domestic spreads. Third, there
might be a regularity in the timing of business cycles across countries: The US
cycle, for example, may be leading the cycle in other Western economies if they
are all aﬀected by the same external factors. That is, there may not be a direct
transmission of cycles from one economy to another, but there may be common
factors that aﬀect the diﬀerent economies in the same way. However, this eﬀect
8may not be simultaneous but instead the diﬀerent economies may take more
time to react to those factors. In this regard, there is some evidence that the
US cycle leads other developed economies.
Bernard and Gerlach (1998) use the latter type of spreads and show that US
and German spreads add signiﬁcant predictive power to national spreads for a
set of developed countries. Fernández Galar (2001) gives evidence for a related
eﬀect by showing that real activity (proxied by recession dummies) in Germany
leads real activity in Spain.
2.2.2 Exchange Rates
Davis and Fagan (1997) comment how the evolution of the exchange rate was
frequently used by small economies as a predictor of future activities. These
arguments are all based on the expansionary eﬀects of real depreciations, which
tend to be associated with expectations of output growth. Also, some of the
arguments for a causal link between the spread and future output rested on the
information contained in the spread about the future evolution of the exchange
rate. Thus, we would expect exchange rate depreciations to predict an increase
in future activity, and therefore a lower probability of a recession.
2.2.3 Changes in Short and Long Rates
Changes in the interest rates at the diﬀerent ends of the yield curve may also
be informative about future output. A widening of the spread may come both
from the short rate going down or from the long rate going up. Both movements
may have slightly diﬀerent implications with regards to future activity. If the
long term rate increases, it can be caused by expectations of a future higher
real rate of interest (in which case this would predict lower future activity)
or by expectations of future inﬂation (which would be associated with higher
future activity). Thus, the predictive content could actually go both ways. Our
argument in Section 2.1 for expected monetary policy required the real rate to
be expected to go down by less than the inﬂation expectations would go up,
which is exactly parallel to our rationale above.
On the other hand, if it is the short term rate that goes down, this will
reﬂect a current expansive monetary policy which is unambiguously associated
with positive real growth. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and
Mishkin (1997) present some evidence for a diﬀering eﬀect of movements at the
two ends of the yield curve, but again this eﬀect is secondary to that of the
spread. Annaert, de Ceuster and Valckx (2001) present a similar analysis, but
based purely on the eﬀect of interest rate volatility.
If risky interest rates are used, then this argument complicates further, given
that an increase in long term rates may be associated with expected increases
in risk, so there will be now three possible sources of movement of the long rate,
with diﬀerent implications with respect to future activity.
92.2.4 Monetary Aggregates
Some of the arguments developed above rely on ﬁnancial variables reacting faster
to monetary policy actions than real activity, which again leads us to think that
it is monetary indicators that should be used as predictors. As Davis and
Fagan (1997) comment, monetary aggregates have indeed been widely used as
indicators of the monetary policy stance and of expected movements in output.
However, they also note that monetary aggregates tend to be easily distorted by
ﬁnancial innovations and major ﬁnancial events In fact, as Blinder (1998) states,
most Central Banks have for all purposes abandoned monetary aggregates as
intermediate targets, and agents and policymakers are increasingly looking at
more stable (and more easily measurable) indicators.
Still, there is evidence (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998) that the evolution of
some monetary aggregate has information additional to that of the spread and
other ﬁnancial variables.
2.2.5 The Central Bank’s Discount Rate
A similar argument to what was said in the case of monetary aggregates applies
here. If one could observe the CB’s monetary policy stance directly, this would
amount to observing the direct cause of future output changes. In other words,
observing CB’s actions should have information on the direction of future output
movements. There is no easy way to gather information on the most frequently
used instrument of monetary policy, open market operations. We do have access
to another instrument, namely the discount rate. Changes in the discount rate
aﬀect directly the availability of funds for commercial banks, and therefore their
ability to expand monetary base by giving loans. A lowering of the discount
rate should have the same eﬀects as a monetary expansion, and thus should
be associated with higher future output and a lower probability of a future
recession. However, the evidence in favor of the predictive power of the discount
rate is weak. Estrella and Mishkin (1997) used it in their comparative analysis
of European economies and found little evidence of signiﬁcant predicting power.
2.2.6 Stock Returns
If stock prices are indeed forward looking variables that depend on the expec-
tations of future dividends and ﬁrm proﬁts, returns on a stock index today
should be related with increased expected activity and therefore they should
have predictive power additional to that of interest rates.
Evidence of the predictive power of stock returns can be found in Estrella and
Hardouvelis (1991), Davis and Fagan (1997) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998).
Annaert, de Ceuster and Valckx (2001) show the existence of an additional link
between stock market volatility and future real activity.
102.3 Evidence for Europe and Spain
Evidence on the predictive power of the spread and other ﬁnancial variables
is still scarce for Europe, and much more scarce for most European countries:
Published evidence so far has focused on Germany, the UK and France. The
ﬁrst multicountry analysis that includes evidence for European countries that
we are aware of was carried out by Estrella and Mishkin (1997). They found
that the term spread has a high predictive power for Germany and the US, but
this power is signiﬁcantly lower for France and still lower for Italy. Bernard
and Gerlach (1998) found signiﬁcant predictive power for some countries such
as Canada, Germany, the US and France but much lower for Belgium, the UK,
the Netherlands and Japan. They also found that German and US spreads
can be used to predict future activity in some of the other European countries.
McMillan (2002) reports a low informational content about future activity of
the spread for the case of the UK. Ahrens (2002) reports also predictive power
in the spread for eight OECD countries. He ﬁts a Markov-switching process to
the spreads, although he ﬁnds that the two-state process does not add much
predictive power over the simple use of the spread.
The comments in Section 2.1, especially those related to the independency
of monetary policies, make the analysis of a smaller European country, such as
Spain, very relevant. Indeed, the evidence cited above for the case of Italy (Es-
trella and Mishkin, 1997) runs along this lines. The fact that the independency
of the Spanish monetary policy can easily be called into question, especially
in the last twenty years, makes it likely that the results that held for bigger
countries such as the US, Germany or the UK may not hold for Spain. In fact,
the only article along these lines that has so far focused on the Spanish case,
Alonso et al. (2001), found that there is no predictive power at all in Spanish
ﬁnancial indicators, especially in the spread.
3 Methodology
We set now to analyze the evidence for the informational content of the term
spread and other ﬁnancial variables for the case of Spain. The theoretical ar-
guments in Section 2 should be enough to make the analysis of Spain especially
relevant. Evidence of predictive power has been found for other big European
economies, but mostly for the major countries, which have autonomous mon-
etary policies and are less dependent on neighboring economies. Spain is a
mid-size country within the euro zone, which is quite dependent on both other
European economies and on the US for trade purposes. Also, due to the will-
ingness to join the EU and, posteriorly, the EMU its economic policies (both
ﬁscal and monetary) have been substantially constrained by those of the other
major EMU players, most notably Germany. The analysis of the predictive
power of ﬁnancial variables in Spain can therefore provide further insights on
the relevance of the diﬀerent determinants of that predictive power and clarify
some of the conﬂicting arguments as to the direction of that predictability.
113.1 Data
Table 1 contains the main sources of our data, the measures employed for each
of the conceptual variables and the available range for the diﬀerent measures.
Most of the variables are available for the period ranging from 1970:1 to 2002:1.
Two variables eﬀectively constrain the period of the sample to start in January
1979. The constraining variables are the interest rates on Spanish T-bills and
the government bond yields, which are available only starting 3:1978 and 1:1979
respectively.
Insert Table 1
All the variables introduced have been transformed to guarantee stationarity.
Interest rate changes are stationary by construction, so no transformation is
necessary. The term spread has been subject to unit root tests, which reject
the hypothesis of a unit root at the 1% conﬁdence level. In the case of the
real exchange rate, stock prices and the monetary aggregate, all of them present
evidence of unit roots and are therefore included in the analysis in terms of their
logarithmic growth rate.
The only variable that requires additional explanation is the recession indi-
cator, but we defer discussion of that variable until Section 3.3.
3.2 Econometric Methodology
Following Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Estrella and Mishkin (1997, 1998)
and Bernard and Gerlach (1998) we analyze the predictive power of the spread
and other ﬁnancial variables when forecasting the probability of a future re-
cession. Analyses with output growth (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991, Davis
and Fagan, 1997, Hamilton and Kim, 2002) usually give poorer results. First of
all, given that recessions in developing economies are usually mild in terms of
output declines, the dependent variable has little variation around its average
value, especially during economic downturns. The information in the growth
variable can be ampliﬁed by using an indicator for recessionary and expansion-
ary months. Second, the spread has been found to predict better when drastic
changes in output take place (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991). Given that these
do seldom take place, the ampliﬁcation provided by the binary variable can help
detect the relevant relationships. Furthermore, the prediction of recessions on
their own stance is important, given the (monetary and ﬁscal) policy interest
and the public interest in understanding recessions.
Our dependent variable is deﬁned as the indicator
yt =
½
0 if month t is an expansionary month
1 if month t is a recessionary month
¾
The deﬁnition of a month as a recessionary month deserves a further ex-
planation, so we devote Section 3.3 to explaining the methodology used for the
dating of the recessions.
12Once we have the (0,1) recession variable, we use a probit model, where we
specify the probability that the economy will be in a recession as a function of
a single index that depends on a set of parameters β, and a set of observable
variables xt. These explanatory variables will usually be lagged values of our
variables of interest (i.e. lagged spread, lagged German spread, etc.). Hereafter,
we write xt−k as the set of explanatory variables, to emphasize the fact that
they are k-period lagged values or, alternatively, that we are trying to predict
the probability of a recession k periods ahead by using current information.




where F is, in this case, the cumulative distribution function of the normal
distribution. Of course, given the deﬁnition of our dependent variable it follows
P(yt =0 |xt−k,βk)=1− F(β
0
kxt−k)=1− Ft (2)
from where the full (log)likelihood of a sample can be constructed, given values








Estimation of these parameters by QMLE is straightforward since the like-
lihood function is globally concave. The interpretation of the value of the pa-
rameters is a little more involved, given the inherent nonlinearity of the model.
Thus, the marginal eﬀect of xt corresponds now to the increase in the proba-
bility that yt will be equal to one given an increase of one unit in xt, but the
formula for that marginal eﬀect (which is, of course, the derivative of Ft with





kxt−k) = βkft,w h e r eft is the
density function of the normal variable for the value of the indicator β
0
kxt−k.5
Also, R2 as a function of the sum of squares loses its meaning. Alternative
measures of the goodness of ﬁt have been proposed, and we use the pseudo-R2








where Lu is the value of the above (log)likelihood of the estimated (unrestricted)
model, and Lc is the (log)likelihood of the model where all slope parameters have
been set to zero.
Once the parameters have been estimated, forecasts of the probability of
recession can be constructed by collecting data on xt−k.A s i m p l e o n e - p e r i o d
5The interpretation of the sign of the parameters, however, is the same as that in linear
models.
13ahead prediction of the probability that the economy will go into a recession in
the following period could be obtained by estimating the model as
b P(yt =1 |xt−1, b β1)=F(b β
0
1xt−1) (5)
and the predictions can, of course, be made for a longer horizon of k months
into the future by reestimating the model using
b P(yt =1 |xt−k, b βk)=F(b β
0
kxt−k) (6)
In this paper, to keep the parallelism with some of the cited references, we
predict recessions one month ahead, and one to eight quarters ahead, so k in
our case will be k =1 ,3,6,9,12,15,18,21,24.
There is a problem with the standard errors of this estimate, given that
the k-period ahead forecast introduces an MA structure in the errors which
deems regular QMLE standard errors inconsistent (Hansen and Hodrick, 1980,
for the discussion when yt is a continuous variable; Poirier and Ruud, 1988, and
Estrella and Rodrigues, 1998, for the discussion on the 0-1 dependent variable).
To complicate matters further, the errors in the original variable (which could be
interpreted as a continuous version of the recession indicator) are not observable,
and therefore it is not easy to account or correct for possible time structure in
those errors.
We follow here the procedure of Estrella and Rodrigues (1998), that build
from a GMM interpretation of the ﬁrst order conditions of the QMLE estimator
of the regular probit model.
In the above model, deﬁne ft = F0
t, ut = yt−Ft and w2
t =1 /Ft(1−Ft).T h e n
the FOC of the QMLE estimate of βk that come from setting the derivatives of





These equations, which could be used as the moments of a GMM estima-
tor, can be interpreted as a non-linear least squares problem that minimizes a
quadratic function of u2
t. Under some assumptions on the distribution of the
x, the estimators are consistent regardless of the structure of the errors. We
can then construct a GMM estimator of the covariance matrix of these mo-
ment conditions, which would yield consistent estimates of the covariance of the
estimates. Deﬁne ht = utw2
tftxt and h =
PT
t=1 ht. Estimation in the GMM
framework implies selecting the values of the elements in βk that minimize
h0Wh for some weighting matrix W. Note that any positive deﬁnite W will
produce the QML estimators, given that the number of moment conditions (the
derivatives of L with respect to βk) is the same as the number of parameters.
We need to estimate now the covariance of the parameter estimates, which
is a function of the covariance of the moments, h, and of the derivatives of the
14moments with respect to the parameters. For the variance of the moments we








from which we can construct a Newey-West type estimator by weighting the
autocovariances









where if λj =1we have the regular estimator in Hansen (1982) and if we set
λj =1−
j
m+1 we have the Newey-West (1987) weighting scheme. With a proper
selection of m (that grows with T b u ta taf r a c t i o n a lp o w e r ) ,t h i sm a t r i xi sa
consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of the orthogonality conditions
(moments).
Given that we have the estimates for the parameters obtained with W = I
(there is no asymptotic gain in using other weighting matrices) a consistent
















∂β and S is deﬁned above.
With this correction to the standard errors, the FOC of the QMLE can be
used to get consistent point estimates of the parameters and then to get the
correct standard errors and t-stats. We follow this procedure and compute,
along with the regular QMLE standard errors, Hansen-corrected and Newey-
West corrected standard errors, all of them with lag length m equal to the
one dictated by Newey-West’s rule of m =4 ( N/100)
2
9. Estrella and Rodrigues
(1998) do not ﬁnd any of the two versions of the corrected standard errors to
dominate the other, so we have decided to present both sets, along with the
regular QMLE errors.
3.3 Dating the Recessions
The deﬁnition of certain months or quarters as recessionary months is not an
easy task. In the case of the US, for example, the NBER deﬁnes which quar-
ters are oﬃcially considered recessionary, but the procedure has been subject
to criticism. The OECD is now elaborating a turning point list for its mem-
bers, but the list of the countries for which it is elaborated is so far incomplete
and the dates are still being subject to scrutiny by both academic and policy-
makers. Furthermore, the data series used for dating each country’s phases are
diﬀerent, and thus the procedure makes the results across countries less directly
comparable.
15The issue of how to detect the phases of the cycle is in fact still a subject of
heated debate among academics. In particular, there are two main approaches
currently being used to locate the expansionary / contractionary phases of a
cycle. One, pioneered by Hamilton (1989) advocates a parametric speciﬁcation
of the data generating process of the variable of interest, where two diﬀerent
regimes are allowed, one which corresponds to the expansions and therefore
contains some type of upward trend and another which corresponds to the con-
tractions and therefore contains a downward trend. Examples of this approach
are Goodwin (1993), Diebold and Rudebusch (1996) and those contained in the
book by Kim and Nelson (1999). The second approach takes a nonparametric
perspective, and instead of ﬁtting a fully-speciﬁed statistical data generating
process, looks at the original data series in search for the speciﬁcf e a t u r e so ft h e
cycle. That is, this procedure looks for periods of generalized upward trend,
which will be identiﬁed with the expansions, and periods of a generalized down-
ward trend which will be identiﬁed with the contractions. The key feature of
this analysis is the location of turning points, peaks and troughs, in the series.
These turning points, that correspond to the switch from an expansion to a
contraction (peak) and viceversa (trough) determine the diﬀerent phases of the
cycle. This approach was ﬁrst applied by Bry and Boschan (1971) to the lo-
cation of business cycles, but has since then been used also by Watson (1994),
Artis et al. (1997) and Harding and Pagan (2000, 2002a).
We consider that the advantages of the nonparametric approach, and its
intuitiveness make it a preferred methodology,6 a n ds ow eu s et h er e s u l t si n
a paper by Gómez Biscarri (2002) that uses the Bry-Boschan nonparametric
algorithm to date the expansions and contractions in a set of 14 European
countries and the US. This paper incorporates the modiﬁcations in the original
algorithm introduced by Artis et al. (1997), who use only one series of industrial
production to locate the turning points. The results in Artis et al. (1997)
have been widely used by researchers doing analyses similar to ours. However,
the data in that paper covered a period ranging only up to December, 1993.
The paper by Gómez Biscarri (2002) uses the same algorithm to locate the
recessionary months but the data continue until January 2002, thus making it
ideal for our purposes. The cited paper contains all the details of the dating
algorithm and comparisons with the results in AKO.
Figure 1 shows the series of Spanish industrial production used in the cited
paper, where the identiﬁed recessionary periods (those ranging from a peak to
a trough) have been shaded for convenience of inspection. The speciﬁcd a t e s
of the peaks and troughs obtained, that mark the beginning and end of the
recessionary and expansionary phases of the Spanish cycles, are listed in Table
2. For the purposes of our analysis, those months between a peak and a trough
are considered recessionary, and have a value of yt =1 . Recessions are assumed
to start the month following the peak and end the month identiﬁed as the
6We do not comment on the advantages / disadvantages of one approach vs. the other.





4R e s u l t s
A probit equation of the form in (5) has been estimated using a range of in-
dependent variables. Common to all equations is the inclusion of the domestic
spread, which is our main variable of interest. In addition to the domestic
spread, we add one by one the other possible indicators, namely the German
term spread, the US term spread, stock returns, real exchange rate appreciation,
changes in short and long rates, changes in the Bank of Spain’s discount rate
and the rate of growth of a monetary aggregate. In all cases we estimate (5) for
k =1 ,3,6,9,12,15,18,21,24, thus analyzing the predictive ability of the spread
at horizons of one month, and one to eight quarters. All the tables present the
results of the slope coeﬃcients of the relevant variables (the intercept is omit-
ted) for the 9 diﬀerent forecast horizons, and the three sets of t-statistics. Also,
the tables include the pseudo R2, that gives an estimate of the goodness of ﬁt
achieved by the variables in the model.
We do not comment on the diﬀerences between the three sets of t-statistics.
It can be seen, though, that both sets of consistent standard errors (Hansen
weighted and Newey-West weighted) yield very similar values of the t-stats,
which are consistently smaller than regular QMLE t-stats. This result, robust
across forecast horizons and independent variables, gives strong evidence for the
existence of a time structure on the errors of the model, and therefore for the
inconsistency of regular QMLE standard errors and t-statistics.7 This evidence
casts serious doubts on the results in other papers that have not used the correct
standard errors. In fact, it can be seen that in several cases the correct t-stats
are in the area of non-signiﬁcance whereas the QMLE are in the rejection area.
This is most noticeable, and most painful, in the case of the domestic spread
(Table 3).
We turn now to an analysis of the diﬀerent explanatory variables.
4.1 The spread and Foreign Spreads
Estimates for the model that uses the domestic spread as the only independent
variable appear in Table 3. The coeﬃcients are quite stable across forecast
horizons, but also the fact that there does not seem to be any predictive power in
the domestic spread is evident. QMLE t-stats are above signiﬁcance levels, but
the corrected t-stats are consistently below, and give no evidence of predictive
power at all. The extremely low values of the pseudo R2 conﬁrm this result.
7If there were no time structure, then the autocovariances of the moments would all be
zero and the three sets of standard errors would be identical.
17A l s o ,o n ec a ns e et h a tt h es i g no ft h ec o e ﬃcient changes across forecasting
horizons with no clear pattern. There does not seem to be any diﬀerence in the
predicting power across diﬀerent horizons. This result is therefore extremely
robust for our data and in line with the scarce literature that has analyzed the
Spanish economy before (Alonso et al., 2001): The term spread in Spain does
not have any power to predict future changes in real activity, and therefore, to
give a warning for incoming recessions.
We have already hinted at the reasons why this could be the case. The fact
that Spain does not have a clearly independent monetary policy, or at least
it has not had it for the last twenty some years given its dependence on the
government and its entry into the European Union, most likely accounts for this
lack of informational content of ﬁnancial variables. The Bank of Spain indeed
became oﬃcially independent from the Government in the early 1990’s, but
mostly because of EU requirements. Then, the regulations of the EMS before
its collapse in 1993 and the Maastricht convergence criteria after 1992 have
caused that monetary policy in Spain post-1992 has been mainly determined
by the need to meet Maastricht’s monetary objectives and by the actions of
G e r m a n ya n d ,t oal e s s e re x t e n t ,F r a n c e .I ti sn os u r p r i s et os e et h a tﬁnancial
and monetary variables in Spain seem to bear no relation with real activity.
Then of course the question is whether this dependency of Spain with respect
to Germany is indeed there and reﬂected in the data. We show in Table 4 the
results of the probit equation that includes now both the domestic term spread
and the term spread of Germany. The results in that table are striking. The
predictive content of the domestic spread is still nonexistent. However, the
German spread presents a signiﬁcant ability to predict Spanish recessions. This
ability is highest at the one quarter horizon, but it remains fairly high up to
four quarters into the future. The coeﬃcient attached to the German spread is
high and signiﬁcant. Its predictive power peaks at one quarter, for which the
pseudo R2 is an impressive 33%, and then it declines consistently until it loses
predictive power at the ﬁve quarter horizon. The sign of the coeﬃcients is the
predicted for riskless spreads (i.e. a widening of the spread signals an increase
in activity and therefore a lower probability of a recession) and the magnitude
of the coeﬃcients evolves in a parallel way to the pseudo R2,a si sr e a s o n a b l e .
One should not be surprised by this result, since it is giving conﬁrmation to
our previous story. It may be that the German spread is giving a reasonable
picture of the monetary policy stance of the Bundesbank,8 and, given that other
European countries were followers of the Bundesbank policies, this stance also
characterizes the stance of other Central Banks. An alternative reading of these
results could be that the German spread is predicting recessions in Germany
that get afterwards transmitted to Spain given the dependence, in real terms,
of the Spanish economy with respect to that of Germany. However, this real
dependence is probably not that strong to justify such a powerful inﬂuence.
8We have to consider that our data only contain three years of the period during which
the ECB has been operating. The fact that the results are stable also for the ECB period
give additional insights that conﬁrm the fact that the monetary policy within the union may
be too highly inﬂuenced by German economic conditions.
18Table 5 shows the results of using the US term spread instead of the German.
Again, the results for the domestic spread do not change at all. The US spread
seems to have no predictive power for Spanish recessions in short horizons (one
month or one-two quarters). However, at a three quarter horizon the US spread
begins to have signiﬁcant predictive power, and this predictive power keeps
increasing until quarter ﬁve, where it peaks at a level of the pseudo R2 of 18%,
which is quite high for such a long horizon. The predictive power stays for the
seven and even eight quarter horizons. Again, the coeﬃcients have all a negative
sign, as predicted by most of our theoretical arguments. The reasons for this
result are probably coming from the real side more than from the monetary side.
Spain is very much dependent in real terms from the US. Thus, the predictive
power of the US term spread might come from the fact that it can predict US
recessions (this is by now a result that has been conﬁrmed by many studies)
that then get transmitted to the Spanish economy. This may be also the reason
why the forecasting ability is not present for very short horizons, but only for
medium terms. A second reason could just be the eﬀect on the world interest
rate of US monetary policy. Given the relevance acquired in the latter years
by the actions of the Federal Reserve, it could be argued that the Fed’s moves
are taken as a reference by the rest of the countries, and then we have another
“non-independent Spanish monetary policy” type of argument, but coming this
time from the relevance of the US in the world economy and in world ﬁnancial
markets.
Table 6 presents the results of the analysis that includes all three spreads at
the same time. The results are perfectly coherent with those in Tables 3-5 that
only included one or two of the spreads: The values of the coeﬃcients are very
stable. That is, there does not seem to be a problem of collinearity of the spreads
(which in the case of a probit equation might lead to more confusing eﬀects than
in the linear case). The predictive power of this equation is now high both for
short horizons (where the German rate takes most of the power) and for long
horizons (where the US spread does the work). At all horizons pseudo R2’s are
above 18%, and they reach 36% for one and two quarters. It seems, therefore,
that an analysis that looked at these two spreads could do a substantial job
forecasting the probability of recessions in Spain even for long horizons. The
conclusion follows that these two spreads should be useful monetary indicators
for the economic authorities of Spain. Now, of course, the monetary authority
has been surrendered to the ECB (which most likely does use these two spreads
as secondary indicators), but other government authorities should deﬁnitely
take into account the information contained in these two ﬁnancial indicators
as a useful predictor of future real activity and of future recessions within the
country.
Insert Tables 3-6
These two eﬀects could, alternatively, be understood in the context of the
literature that has focused on ﬁnding the macroeconomic factors that determine
interest rates or stock returns (Dungey, Martin and Pagan, 2000 and references
19therein). What we have termed the US eﬀect could be identiﬁed with a world
factor in the terminology of the above literature, that is, with the inﬂuence of
some factor related to worldwide economic conditions. In the same manner,
the German eﬀect would refer to a European factor, that measures economic
conditions in Europe and that therefore has informational content about the
evolution of the Spanish economy, which is directly subject to the inﬂuence
of European economic conditions. Thus, we may have uncovered a possible
decomposition of the evolution of the Spanish economy, that is subject to both
world and European factors. The timing of the eﬀect of these factors is still
relevant: The world factor seems to aﬀect Spain with a few quarters delay,
whereas the European factor has more immediate eﬀects.
4.2 Other variables
We comment now on the predictive power of other variables that were mentioned
throughout Section 2.
First, we use an indicator of stock returns. Table 7 shows that there is
very little evidence of stock returns having predictive power over real activity
in the short run (one month or one quarter) or in the long run (six to eight
quarters), but there is some mild predicting power over medium horizons (two
to four quarters), although the goodness of ﬁt statistic is never above 6%. The
sign of the relationship is consistent across horizons, and consistent with the
theoretical argument that forward looking stock prices will react (so the return
will be positive) anticipating future growth in activity (so a lower probability
of a recession). Thus, the use of stock prices as a possible indicator of future
real activity by policymakers may be warranted, although its predicting power
is not high.
Insert Table 7
Table 8 shows the results of the model that uses real exchange rate appre-
ciations as possible indicators of future activity and of recessions. Results for
this variable, along with the domestic spread, could not be more disappointing.
No predictive power is apparent, the sign of the coeﬃcients changes almost at
random and the value of the coeﬃcients swings wildly. There seems, therefore
to be no information at all in real exchange rates, to predict future activity.
Reasons for this lack of connection, considering that Spain is a moderately open
country, may be that the ﬂoating band of the exchange rate (and the require-
ments to keep inﬂation and interest rates low during the Maastricht transition)
forced Spain to keep a real exchange rate out of line with fundamentals. It
could also be due to the fact that, as analyses of import and export elasticities
show, neither exports nor imports are very sensitive, at least in a short run,
to movements in the exchange rate. Therefore, a J-curve type of phenomenon
would eliminate short term real eﬀects from exchange rate depreciations.
Insert Table 8
20Changes in interest rates at the diﬀe r e n te n d so ft h ey i e l dc u r v eh a v es o m e
predictive power. The results in Table 9 show that changes in the long rate
predict the probability of a recession, though mildly, at long horizons. The
coeﬃcient of the change in the long rate is positive, indicating that a steepening
of the yield curve because the long rate increases tends to be associated with
a higher probability of recession. Notice that including the changes in both
rates in the equation is equivalent to including the change in the spread from
the previous period, although allowing for the eﬀect of both ends of the yield
c u r v et ob ed i ﬀerent. The fact that only the change in the long term has some
predictive power hints at the fact that increases in the long rate are associated
more with increases in expected real rates (if the government bond is considered
to have a risk premium, the argument of increased risk would also apply) and
not in expected inﬂation. Thus, an increase in the long rate would be associated
with a higher probability of a future decline in activity.
Insert Table 9
Results on using the changes in the central bank’s discount rate appear in
Table 10. As was already found in Estrella and Mishkin (1997), the inclusion
of a central bank rate does not seem to add much predictive power on top of
what the spread has, which in this case is little anyway. As we have mentioned,
the Bank of Spain has been substantially constrained in its use of the discount
rate as a policy instrument aimed at real activity. It is not surprising to ﬁnd
therefore, that the interest rate in its direct control seems not to have any
information about the evolution of output.
Insert Table 10
The last variable we analyze is a monetary aggregate, measured by M3.
Growth of monetary aggregates has been a traditional intermediate target of
monetary policy, especially in big countries. Results of including the growth
rate of M3 in the probit equation, shown in Table 11, are so disappointing that
they do not merit further comment. There are at least two possible reasons for
this lack of predictive power. First, as we have mentioned before, Central Banks
have almost unanimously substituted monetary aggregates as immediate targets
of monetary policy for more easily manageable variables such as interest rates
(Blinder, 1998). Second, it may be argued that it is real money that inﬂuences
activity. However, it is probably growth in nominal money that gives a better
idea of the contractiveness or expansiveness of monetary policy, regardless of
the inﬂationary consequences. Also, throughout the period studied (the 1970’s
are not included due to data constraints), inﬂation rates have been more stable
in Spain, although declining. This means that latter growth rates in real M3 are
higher than those at the beginning of the sample. In any case, the performance
of the variable is very poor. There does not seem to be any predictive power
of increases in the quantity of money regarding future activity. The additional
argument by Davis and Fagan (1997) that monetary aggregates are too subject
to ﬁnancial events and innovations in ﬁnancial practices to be very useful in
21practice may apply here.
Insert Table 11
Finally, we estimate a complete model, where we include all the variables
that have been found to be relevant in the last analyses. Results for this model,
that includes foreign spreads, the changes in the short and long rate and the
return of the stock index, are shown in Table 12. It can be seen that the
coeﬃcient estimates, their signs and their signiﬁcance remain stable (thus not
hinting at problems of collinearity among our explanatory variables). In fact,
the only signiﬁcant change is that now the change in the short rate seems to
show some predictive power at short horizons, with the predictability going in
the direction that should be expected: The sign is positive, showing that an
increase in the short rate is associated with a higher probability of recession, or
with an anticipated decline in real activity, which is what we should expect given
that changes in short rates correspond to changes in the real rate or, in other
words, to a tightening of current monetary policy. The predictive power of the
full model is slightly above that of the model with the foreign spreads, reaching
a pseudo R2 of 39% at a two quarter horizon. The improvement provided by
the stock return variable and by the changes in the rates is not big, though,
so it looks that the model with the three spreads is quite a good predictor of
future activity or of recessionary periods.
Insert Table 12
4.3 In sample forecasts
We review in this subsection the performance of some of the estimated models
in terms of in-sample prediction of the recessionary periods. Thus, we estimate
the models using the data for the whole sample, and we then ﬁnd the ﬁtted
values of yt, or the best guesses for the probability of a recession k months
ahead, given data up to xt−k. In other words, in the graphs we are going to
plot the estimate of the probability of being in a recessionary month at time t
given data that was available k months before.
b P(yt =1 |xt−k, b βk)=F(b β
0
kxt−k) (11)
The forecasts are in-sample given that we do use all the data available to
estimate the parameters of the relationship and make the predictions of the
value of yt.
Figures 2 and 3 plot the forecasted probability of a recession at time t given
data up to time t −k (values for k are 1,3,6,9,12,15,18,21,24), for the model
that uses only the domestic term spread as explanatory variable. The graphs
include a line that marks the recessionary periods (i.e. those for which the
predicted probability should be one). It is clear from both ﬁgures that the
22performance of the domestic spread is quite poor, and not much can be gained
in terms of predicting recessions from looking at that variable.
Insert Figures 2 and 3
Figures 4 and 5 plot the same series of in-sample forecasts of the probability
of a recession coming from the model that includes the German and the US
s p r e a d .W ec a ns e et h a tn o wt h eﬁrst two recessions and the last one in 2001
can be quite accurately predicted, and this predictive power is best at a 1-
2 quarter horizon. It can be seen ,though, that the model misses one of the
recessionary periods, and gives a false signal for another period in the mid
1990’s. Surprisingly enough, these two mispredictions improve somewhat when
the forecasting horizon lengthens.
Insert Figures 4 and 5
Figures 6 and 7 show the ﬁnal results of in-sample forecasts for the full model
that incorporates also the changes in short and long rates and the stock returns.
The results do not change much for this model, and even though the predictive
power is slightly improved, the additional variables do not seem to add much in
terms of improving the forecasts.
Insert Figures 6 and 7
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the pseudo R2’s for the diﬀerent models that
we have commented on, which are, along with the in-sample forecasts, a measure
of how good a ﬁt the models are providing to the probability of recession. It
is interesting to see the diﬀering eﬀect of the US and the German spread (in
Figure 8a), and how the rest of the variables, even those that yielded signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients, provide close to no improvement over the domestic spread (Figures
8b and 8c), although in the full model they add a little predictive power at all
horizons (Figure 8d).
Insert Figure 8
4.4 Out of sample forecasts: A Recession in 2001?
Even though in-sample forecasts usually yield fairly good predictions, most mod-
els are found to perform quite poorly when asked to predict out of sample (Es-
trella and Mishkin, 1998). Thus, we conduct a simple, and at the same time
interesting on its own right, exercise of out of sample forecasting. We reestimate
our full model, using initially only data from 1979:1 to 1999:12. Then, using
the estimated parameters and the next observation of the explanatory variables
we predict the value of yt for the next period. That is, we calculate a one step
ahead forecast of the probability of recession, given only past data. For exam-
ple, in the one month forecasting horizon we would estimate the model using
23data on yt from 1979:2 to 1999:12 and data on the explanatory variables from
1979:1 to 1999:11. Then, given the estimated parameters, we predict the value
of yt in 2000:1 using the value of the explanatory variables in 1999:12. Thus,
we are emulating the process that a policymaker would follow when estimating
future probabilities of recession, by reestimating the model every time a new
datapoint is available. We keep doing the process until the last observation, in
2002:1. Thus, the last 25 predictions in the graphs in Figures 9 and 10 are done
in a recursive way, whereas the ﬁrst 250 are just simple in-sample predictions
done with the data from 1979:1 to 1999:12. It can be seen in the Figures that
one could have done a great job at predicting the recession (or, even though it
may not qualify “oﬃcially” as a recession, there deﬁnitely was a deceleration
of economic activity and industrial production) in late 2000 and early 2001,
which mildly hit some of the Western economies. Notice that the predictions,
especially those at longer horizons, are done without using any data on the in-
coming recession, that is, the fact that the estimated probabilities jump and
accurately predict the recession is based exclusively on the past performance of
the explanatory variables to predict recessions.
Insert Figures 9 and 10
The conclusion from this out-of-sample exercise is quite striking, then. A
Spanish policymaker doing a similar analysis, and updating the estimates as
information became available would have been able to give quite an accurate
prediction of the incoming recession three and even four quarters ahead. This is
good news, for it does conﬁrm the predictive power, even out of sample (which
is the interesting feature of the analysis for policymakers), of a simple model
that includes only three ﬁnancial variables and, maybe, some information on
stock prices.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We have conducted an analysis on the informational content of some ﬁnancial
variables, such as domestic and foreign term spreads, stock prices and real ex-
change rates, about future real economic activity (proxied by an indicator of
the recessionary months). We have focused on analyzing the case of Spain, a
midsize European economy with severe constraints on the independence of its
monetary policy.
Our results show that the domestic spread has absolutely no informational
content about future real activity, whereas the German spread has substantial
predictive power in the short term (1-3 quarters) and a US term spread has
predictive power in the longer term (5-7 quarters). This of course constitutes
evidence in favor of the informational content of spreads in general, but only
when the monetary policy of the country in particular is independent. In the
case of Spain, where there are reasons to suspect that its monetary policy was
highly dependent on that of Germany, and of course highly aﬀected by that
24in the US, the domestic spread loses all informational content. On the other
hand, the spreads of those two countries contain signiﬁcant information about
the future. We identify the German and US spreads as a “European” and
a “world” or “American” factor respectively: These variables are informative
about the general economic conditions in both Europe and the rest of the world
and therefore should have informational content about economic conditions in
Spain. We show that the relationship between these two factors and the Spanish
economy are robust and stable over time, to the extent that the deceleration
that took place in industrial production in Spain in late 2000 could have been
accurately predicted as far as four quarters in advance.
Other variables such as the changes in diﬀerent interest rates, stock prices,
exchange rates and monetary aggregates have very little, if at all, informational
content about future activity. The cases of the real exchange rate, the discount
rate and the monetary aggregate are especially surprising: There is no evidence
of any predictive content in these variables, one of which is usually regarded as
a forward looking variable, and the other two which are directly controlled by
m o n e t a r yp o l i c ya n du s e da sd i r e c ti n s t r u m e n ta n di n t e r m e d i a t et a r g e t ,r e s p e c -
tively. Further investigation of the reasons for failure of these two variables is
therefore a priority both for researchers and for policymakers, especially given
our objective of trying to understand the channels through which policy instru-
ments, or variables that can be inﬂuenced by policy, aﬀect the real side of the
economy.
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28Measure Source Range
Recession Indicator 0,1 Indicator for contractionary months Gómez Biscarri (2002), from IIP index 1:1970-1:2002
IIP Index SA Index of Industrial Production OECD Main Economic Indicators 1:1970-1:2002
Short-Term Rate Interest Rate on T-Bills IFS of the IMF 1:1979-1:2002
Long-Term Rate Long Term Government Bond Yield IFS of the IMF 3:1978-1:2002
German Spread Long Term Government Bond Yield IFS of the IMF
minus Interest Rate on T-Bills
US Spread 10 Yr. Government Bond Yield Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis 1:1970-1:2002
minus Interest Rate on 3 month T-Bills
Stock Market Index General Index of the Madrid Stock Exchange Madrid Stock Exchange Research Dept. 1:1970-1:2002
Real Exchange Rate Real Effective Exchange Rate OECD Main Economic Indicators 1:1970-1:2002
Quantity of Money M3 IFS of the IMF 1:1970-1:2002
Table 1











Identified Peaks and Troughs for Spain (Based on IIP Index)
Table 2
261Month 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q
Spread -0.172 -0.164 -0.144 -0.144 -0.151 -0.160 -0.166 -0.184 -0.219
QMLE -3.341 -3.207 -2.856 -2.786 -2.860 -3.006 -3.130 -3.450 -3.979
Hansen -1.225 -1.269 -1.172 -1.168 -1.179 -1.174 -1.232 -1.364 -1.562
Newey-West -1.563 -1.619 -1.477 -1.460 -1.486 -1.501 -1.569 -1.737 -1.993
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.032 0.035 0.042 0.059
1Month 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q
Spread -0.034 -0.009 0.002 -0.041 -0.089 -0.121 -0.137 -0.157 -0.197
QMLE -0.847 -0.211 0.036 -0.697 -1.534 -2.143 -2.471 -2.842 -3.530
Hansen -0.346 -0.099 0.020 -0.321 -0.629 -0.830 -0.966 -1.118 -1.382
Newey-West -0.429 -0.120 0.023 -0.390 -0.791 -1.064 -1.233 -1.427 -1.765
German Spread -0.939 -0.961 -0.855 -0.679 -0.471 -0.320 -0.258 -0.261 -0.246
QMLE -8.498 -8.845 -8.226 -6.885 -5.051 -3.574 -2.971 -3.003 -2.743
Hansen -3.304 -3.528 -3.440 -2.886 -2.066 -1.393 -1.137 -1.144 -1.092
Newey-West -4.181 -4.499 -4.348 -3.627 -2.612 -1.785 -1.467 -1.471 -1.399
Pseudo R2 0.327 0.333 0.285 0.212 0.129 0.081 0.067 0.075 0.088
1Month 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q
Spread -0.167 -0.148 -0.114 -0.101 -0.098 -0.106 -0.117 -0.146 -0.188
QMLE -3.161 -2.827 -2.185 -1.877 -1.814 -2.080 -2.336 -2.946 -3.693
Hansen -1.154 -1.108 -0.877 -0.785 -0.773 -0.822 -0.950 -1.203 -1.466
Newey-West -1.476 -1.418 -1.114 -0.982 -0.967 -1.047 -1.195 -1.516 -1.864
US Spread -0.043 -0.128 -0.236 -0.339 -0.406 -0.409 -0.389 -0.337 -0.341
QMLE -0.693 -2.076 -3.810 -5.299 -6.318 -6.310 -5.754 -4.766 -4.805
Hansen -0.264 -0.835 -1.506 -2.101 -2.572 -2.666 -2.394 -2.060 -1.974
Newey-West -0.334 -1.054 -1.916 -2.664 -3.251 -3.320 -2.981 -2.583 -2.499
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.048 0.081 0.136 0.177 0.179 0.169 0.148 0.166
Table 4
Parameters and pseudo-R2 of the model with Domestic and German spread




Parameters and pseudo-R2 of the model with Domestic Spread
QMLE, Hansen and Newey-West corrected t-stats in brackets
Table 5
Parameters and pseudo-R2 of the model with Domestic and US spread
QMLE, Hansen and Newey-West corrected t-stats in brackets
FORECASTING HORIZON
271Month 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q
Spread -0.022 0.027 0.075 0.047 -0.008 -0.053 -0.080 -0.112 -0.162
QMLE -0.506 0.521 1.219 0.730 -0.142 -1.027 -1.578 -2.253 -3.265
Hansen -0.205 0.238 0.701 0.371 -0.062 -0.404 -0.637 -0.916 -1.297
Newey-West -0.255 0.290 0.814 0.439 -0.076 -0.516 -0.805 -1.158 -1.649
German Spread -0.951 -1.013 -0.968 -0.793 -0.548 -0.351 -0.280 -0.286 -0.266
QMLE -8.495 -8.640 -8.108 -7.145 -5.363 -3.667 -3.063 -3.192 -2.784
Hansen -3.348 -3.551 -3.452 -3.132 -2.330 -1.495 -1.213 -1.256 -1.158
Newey-West -4.223 -4.512 -4.339 -3.881 -2.906 -1.883 -1.544 -1.597 -1.468
US Spread -0.072 -0.190 -0.325 -0.410 -0.440 -0.410 -0.386 -0.336 -0.339
QMLE -1.157 -3.034 -5.277 -6.290 -6.866 -6.076 -5.475 -4.607 -4.661
Hansen -0.529 -1.449 -2.227 -2.592 -2.810 -2.619 -2.283 -1.957 -1.901
Newey-West -0.635 -1.747 -2.802 -3.244 -3.556 -3.231 -2.838 -2.465 -2.411
Pseudo R2 0.331 0.359 0.359 0.336 0.283 0.226 0.200 0.181 0.195
1Month 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q
Spread -0.168 -0.160 -0.138 -0.137 -0.146 -0.155 -0.163 -0.180 -0.217
QMLE -3.244 -3.117 -2.725 -2.660 -2.775 -2.914 -3.053 -3.364 -3.927
Hansen -1.193 -1.238 -1.123 -1.130 -1.144 -1.147 -1.209 -1.338 -1.547
Newey-West -1.521 -1.577 -1.414 -1.407 -1.441 -1.465 -1.538 -1.702 -1.973
Stock Returns -1.958 -2.050 -3.083 -3.773 -3.232 -2.722 -2.242 -2.354 -1.893
QMLE -1.525 -1.590 -2.247 -2.595 -2.272 -1.970 -1.644 -1.698 -1.389
Hansen -1.974 -1.632 -2.577 -2.854 -2.382 -2.194 -1.897 -1.979 -1.556
Newey-West -1.590 -1.556 -2.330 -2.658 -2.253 -2.017 -1.688 -1.765 -1.427
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.040 0.045 0.056 0.051 0.048 0.046 0.054 0.066
1Month 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q
Spread -0.171 -0.164 -0.144 -0.144 -0.154 -0.162 -0.169 -0.190 -0.223
QMLE -3.323 -3.214 -2.841 -2.790 -2.931 -3.071 -3.216 -3.607 -4.108
Hansen -1.225 -1.282 -1.173 -1.183 -1.231 -1.215 -1.281 -1.448 -1.634
Newey-West -1.562 -1.633 -1.476 -1.473 -1.544 -1.549 -1.628 -1.840 -2.080
Change in RER -1.242 1.480 -1.023 1.346 7.892 5.758 6.330 11.072 7.906
QMLE -0.192 0.225 -0.157 0.215 1.250 0.926 1.007 1.693 1.191
Hansen -0.149 0.191 -0.129 0.163 1.038 0.727 0.833 1.279 1.006
Newey-West -0.162 0.192 -0.134 0.174 1.084 0.778 0.866 1.371 1.052
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.034 0.035 0.038 0.052 0.064
FORECASTING HORIZON
QMLE, Hansen and Newey-West corrected t-stats in brackets
FORECASTING HORIZON
Table 7
Parameters and pseudo-R2 of the model with Domestic spread and (log) Stock Returns
Table 8
Parameters and pseudo-R2 of the model with Domestic Spread 
and the Change in the Real Exchange Rate 
QMLE, Hansen and Newey-West corrected t-stats in brackets
Table 6
Parameters and pseudo-R2 of the model with Domestic, German and US spread
QMLE, Hansen and Newey-West corrected t-stats in brackets
FORECASTING HORIZON
281Month 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q
Spread -0.186 -0.170 -0.141 -0.142 -0.150 -0.163 -0.172 -0.195 -0.230
QMLE -3.531 -3.260 -2.698 -2.640 -2.731 -2.895 -3.029 -3.356 -3.944
Hansen -1.303 -1.291 -1.093 -1.089 -1.122 -1.121 -1.183 -1.313 -1.525
Newey-West -1.660 -1.647 -1.379 -1.362 -1.410 -1.430 -1.505 -1.670 -1.945
Change in Short -0.102 -0.039 0.010 0.000 -0.004 -0.036 -0.056 -0.103 -0.126
QMLE -1.010 -0.378 0.088 0.003 -0.031 -0.304 -0.482 -0.908 -1.115
Hansen -0.899 -0.370 0.083 0.003 -0.028 -0.270 -0.436 -0.774 -0.941
Newey-West -0.958 -0.366 0.085 0.003 -0.029 -0.279 -0.442 -0.809 -0.994
Change in Long -0.228 -0.174 0.209 0.308 0.323 0.623 0.700 0.799 0.528
QMLE -1.095 -0.834 1.005 1.479 1.548 2.877 3.161 3.518 2.417
Hansen -0.906 -0.705 0.770 1.148 1.134 1.995 2.241 2.478 1.697
Newey-West -0.920 -0.723 0.829 1.234 1.263 2.264 2.476 2.720 1.909
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.034 0.029 0.033 0.038 0.064 0.074 0.091 0.080
1Month 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q
Spread -0.167 -0.157 -0.138 -0.138 -0.147 -0.154 -0.161 -0.179 -0.214
QMLE -3.245 -3.058 -2.711 -2.659 -2.790 -2.869 -2.998 -3.338 -3.857
Hansen -1.266 -1.213 -1.116 -1.119 -1.136 -1.121 -1.181 -1.320 -1.515
Newey-West -1.621 -1.546 -1.405 -1.396 -1.436 -1.433 -1.503 -1.680 -1.932
Change in Disc. -0.012 0.014 0.009 -0.001 -0.022 0.006 0.005 -0.002 0.006
QMLE -0.323 0.398 0.252 -0.021 -0.667 0.201 0.154 -0.058 0.190
Hansen -0.737 0.873 0.000 0.000 -0.672 0.524 0.784 -0.173 0.539
Newey-West -0.522 0.560 0.415 -0.033 -0.666 0.307 0.230 -0.086 0.275
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.029 0.023 0.023 0.028 0.030 0.033 0.040 0.056
1Month 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q
Spread -0.170 -0.165 -0.146 -0.144 -0.151 -0.157 -0.165 -0.179 -0.215
QMLE -3.308 -3.213 -2.874 -2.788 -2.848 -2.969 -3.099 -3.382 -3.925
Hansen -1.215 -1.277 -1.182 -1.171 -1.176 -1.164 -1.224 -1.342 -1.545
Newey-West -1.551 -1.627 -1.491 -1.463 -1.483 -1.488 -1.559 -1.708 -1.971
Change in M3 2.177 -1.351 -2.263 -0.857 0.634 3.157 2.654 6.751 6.449
QMLE 0.366 -0.229 -0.367 -0.140 0.103 0.499 0.418 1.059 0.984
Hansen 0.480 -0.367 -0.425 -0.174 0.168 1.015 0.703 1.649 1.957
Newey-West 0.485 -0.294 -0.420 -0.178 0.142 0.737 0.593 1.510 1.468
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.033 0.036 0.047 0.063
Table 11
Parameters and pseudo-R2 of the model with Domestic Spread and Rate of Change of M3
QMLE, Hansen and Newey-West corrected t-stats included
FORECASTING HORIZON
and the change in the Short Rate and in the Long Rate
Table 9
Parameters and pseudo-R2 of the model with Domestic Spread




Parameters and pseudo-R2 of the model with Domestic Spread and Change in the Discount Rate
QMLE, Hansen and Newey-West corrected t-stats included
291Month 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q
Spread -0.005 0.072 0.122 0.079 0.009 -0.052 -0.084 -0.122 -0.170
QMLE -0.108 1.151 1.707 1.094 0.150 -0.939 -1.572 -2.293 -3.255
Hansen -0.044 0.519 1.037 0.561 0.066 -0.372 -0.638 -0.926 -1.277
Newey-West -0.054 0.632 1.180 0.662 0.081 -0.473 -0.802 -1.171 -1.624
German Spread -0.966 -1.064 -1.032 -0.835 -0.562 -0.375 -0.306 -0.315 -0.276
QMLE -8.392 -8.492 -7.893 -7.154 -5.334 -3.725 -3.162 -3.284 -2.855
Hansen -3.348 -3.432 -3.494 -3.363 -2.437 -1.572 -1.287 -1.318 -1.195
Newey-West -4.220 -4.387 -4.347 -4.080 -2.992 -1.960 -1.636 -1.680 -1.516
US Spread -0.097 -0.221 -0.335 -0.422 -0.446 -0.417 -0.386 -0.338 -0.336
QMLE -1.562 -3.584 -5.500 -6.532 -6.957 -6.235 -5.414 -4.621 -4.682
Hansen -0.718 -1.655 -2.359 -2.746 -2.914 -2.697 -2.319 -1.963 -1.900
Newey-West -0.864 -2.010 -2.953 -3.422 -3.659 -3.329 -2.884 -2.485 -2.417
Stock Returns -2.531 -2.814 -3.413 -4.214 -3.380 -2.422 -1.618 -1.601 -1.603
QMLE -1.758 -1.850 -2.225 -2.712 -2.248 -1.704 -1.154 -1.121 -1.123
Hansen -2.584 -1.796 -2.647 -2.947 -2.675 -2.147 -1.336 -1.333 -1.337
Newey-West -1.964 -1.790 -2.379 -2.827 -2.391 -1.869 -1.224 -1.233 -1.236
Change in Short 0.010 0.261 0.391 0.302 0.189 0.057 0.006 -0.061 -0.098
QMLE 0.065 1.655 2.873 2.361 1.596 0.525 0.055 -0.589 -0.911
Hansen 0.045 1.056 2.075 1.699 1.207 0.405 0.044 -0.439 -0.663
Newey-West 0.050 1.231 2.287 1.874 1.317 0.428 0.045 -0.476 -0.739
Change in Long -0.537 -0.613 -0.063 0.052 0.106 0.548 0.663 0.785 0.437
QMLE -2.237 -2.138 -0.225 0.192 0.408 2.153 2.644 3.077 1.826
Hansen -1.725 -1.764 -0.190 0.182 0.339 1.653 1.959 2.314 1.470
Newey-West -1.841 -1.933 -0.207 0.186 0.363 1.788 2.158 2.504 1.598
Pseudo R2 0.347 0.378 0.386 0.373 0.310 0.265 0.239 0.230 0.215
Table 12
Parameters and pseudo-R2 of the Full model
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Figure 8c: Pseudo R2 of models with alternative 
variables
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